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Intellectual Property 






The rising cost of prescription drugs in the United States 
presents a critical challenge in modern public policy. As prices 
rise sharply across all medications,2 personal and public budgets 
are straining to absorb the impact. On the whole, these pricing 
trajectories threaten to roll back decades of improvement in access 
to health care for those at all income levels.3 Appropriately, the 
problem is receiving growing attention from lawmakers, 
regulators, and the media. Absent from this flurry of attention, 
however, as well as from the bulk of the broader literature, is the 
role that certain intellectual-property regimes are playing in 
keeping drug prices high.   
Specifically, industry actors assert trade-secrecy protection in 
order to resist consumer-friendly efforts by regulatory bodies to 
require transparency in drug pricing. On one side, middle players 
in the drug-distribution chain called pharmacy benefit managers 
(PBMs) insist that their pricing arrangements with pharmaceutical 
manufacturers constitute “trade secrets.” On the other side, state 
regulators seek disclosure of such negotiated drug prices—or 
“naked prices”—to expose industry structures that drive up 
pricing and harm the public, arguing that such arrangements 
should not receive trade-secret protection.  
At the core of this standoff are the following questions: Are 
naked prices intellectual property? If so, do they warrant sufficient 
protection to create an immunity to public disclosure when the 
public interest is strong? In other words, if naked price is 
intellectual property, is it only a “thin” right?  
 
1 Excerpted and adapted from Robin Feldman & Charles Tait Graves, 
Naked Price and Pharmaceutical Trade Secret Overreach, 22 YALE J. 
L. & TECH. 61 (2020).  
2 See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-
03-15-0080, INCREASES FOR BRAND-NAME DRUGS IN PART D (2018).  
3 See ROBIN FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY & SECRET HANDSHAKES: THE 
UNSTOPPABLE GROWTH OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES 9–10 (2019). 
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This Chapter challenges the notion that naked prices 
constitute trade secrets and offers grounds for rejecting claims that 
“naked prices” in the pharmaceutical supply chain warrant strong 
protection from disclosure. The Chapter borrows from copyright 
law to advance a new concept of “thin” trade-secret protection that 
can be overcome by appropriate regulatory challenges. 
 
The Problem: PBM Pricing & Trade Secrecy Assertions 
 
Perverse incentives throughout the drug supply chain are 
crucial drivers of the soaring prices borne by payers. Central to 
the drug supply chain are PBMs, the middle players between drug 
companies and insurance plans (including both private insurers 
and Medicare).4 On behalf of insurance plans and patients, PBMs 
negotiate the prices of drugs with the companies. PBMs also help 
the plans set formularies, which determine whether and under 
what terms patients will have access to a particular drug. In an 
ideal world, this system would allow insurance plans and patients 
to pay the lowest cost possible for brand-name drugs. In reality, 
the deals between PBMs and brand companies frequently operate 
to channel patients into more expensive drugs, with adverse long-
term and short-term effects on the system. 
In simplified form, PBMs stand between their clients (the 
health plans) and drug companies. Although a health plan knows 
what it pays when a patient buys a particular drug at the pharmacy, 
the true price paid—at the end of the day and after all rebates have 
been applied—is hidden. Somewhere down the line, the PBM will 
send the health plan a rebate check that aggregates rebates for 
many drug transactions. Along the way, PBMs pocket a large 
portion of the rebate dollars, although the health plans are not 
permitted to know the size of the rebates or the portions retained. 
In fact, the true net price—or “naked price”—and the terms of the 
agreements between PBMs and drug companies are so highly 
guarded that even the health plan’s auditors are not given full 
access to the agreements.  
One might think that the health plans and their patients, let 
alone government auditors, would have the right to know the net 
prices they are paying for each drug and to access the terms of 
 
4 For in an in-depth analysis of PBMs and perverse incentives in the drug 
supply and pricing chain, see generally id. 
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agreements made on their behalf. So, just how is it that these terms 
are so deeply hidden? PBMs and drug companies claim that naked 
price is a trade secret. They have repeatedly and aggressively 
claimed trade-secrecy protection to shelter this system, and its 
impact on rising prices, from both private and public view.5 
These assertions present a real risk that trade-secret law will 
be tugged from its moorings, a risk exemplified by the case of the 
regulatory-disclosure debates. Indeed, the problem of naked 
prices highlights a broader trend: increasingly, companies are 
attempting to assert trade-secrecy claims outside of civil litigation 
in order to block regulatory oversight or public inquiry into 
potentially unsavory business practices. Thus, there is reason to 
fear that an already-broad trade-secret doctrine can be stretched 
even further, harming the public interest. 
Yet claiming price, rebate, and profit-margin information as a 
trade secret is odd, even at first blush. This sort of information 
hardly sounds like intellectual property. Price is not an idea, and 
it certainly is not the product of innovation. The pricing in a PBM 
agreement is not information developed by a company to operate 
its business. Rather, it is a mere deal point negotiated between two 
separate entities. In addition, the very targets of regulation—
artificially inflated prices—are claimed as intellectual property to 
avoid disclosure. Thus, trade-secret law is being deployed as an 
offensive weapon to avoid regulation and to avoid responsibility 
for the public harm created by the supposed “trade secret” itself. 
These aims are quite different from the goal of allowing a business 
to protect the fruits of ideas and innovations that will ultimately 
benefit the public. 
 
Is Naked Price Really a Trade Secret? 
 
On the surface, the elements of proving that a trade secret 
exists in civil litigation are straightforward but general: the 
information cannot be generally known to others who could use 
it, it must be secured with reasonable restrictions, it must have 
economic value to competitors as a result of being secret, and it 
 
5 See, e.g., Compl. at ¶¶ 18, 25, 27–30, 38, 79–85, CaremarkPCS Health, 
LLC v. Sears, No. 18-cv-5943 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. July 16, 2018); Order 
Granting Pet’r Amgen Inc.’s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj., Amgen Inc. v. Cal. 
Corr. Health Serv., No. 18-stcp-03147 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2019). 
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cannot be readily ascertainable in the sense that it can easily be 
cobbled together with minimal time and effort. 
Many cases in civil lawsuits have addressed trade-secrecy 
claims over various types of pricing information,6 but none 
appears to have squarely posed the methodological question of 
whether pricing information is the type of secret that should 
receive protection. Similarly, in cases related to Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) disclosures, courts have generally 
avoided a full-on analysis of whether pricing information, in 
context, is truly protectable information, much less a trade secret.7 
The courts thus have left open the question whether pricing 
information, especially in the context of agreements between 
major PBMs and pharmaceutical companies, is a trade secret in 
the first place, particularly when weighed against a strong public 
interest. 
There is something awkward about claiming pricing 
information—whether a raw price, a profit margin, or related 
details—as one company’s intellectual property. Certainly, 
litigants claim financial information as a trade secret, and 
companies submit information to state and federal regulators 
under seal. But price competition is often open, not hidden. It is 
not something traditionally seen as “property” that is off-limits to 
competitors. In fact, in a market economy, open price competition 
is the norm.  
Indeed, the idea that pricing information should qualify for 
trade-secret protection does not fit the traditional justification for 
intellectual-property laws: to encourage and incentivize spending 
and research to develop useful commercial information. 
Companies need no incentive to buy low and sell high, for that is 
the ordinary function of the market. And a price is hardly the same 
 
6 E.g., Progressive Prod., Inc. v. Schwartz, 258 P.3d 969, 978 (Kan. 
2011) (affirming a finding that pricing information was not a trade secret, 
in a lawsuit against former employees, where facts showed that 
customers could freely communicate “with each other about how much 
they were paying for certain work”). 
7 E.g., Essex Electro Eng’g, Inc. v. U.S. Sec’y of the Army, 686 F. Supp. 
2d 91, 93–94 (D.D.C. 2010) (protecting unit prices in an Army contract 
against FOIA disclosure based on a showing of substantial, if “highly 
speculative,” competitive harm). 
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thing as what ordinarily qualifies as a trade secret: the underlying 
design, development, or product being bought and sold. 
   
Trade-Secret Law: Stepping Back from the Brink 
 
Contemporary intellectual property theory provides useful 
guidance in demonstrating why naked price is not a protectable 
trade secret. The reasons why are straightforward. A price is not 
an idea. It is a negotiated point representing value to be 
exchanged. It is a point on a line between two adverse parties, not 
an act of creation. A price does not spur future development or 
additional thinking: it is not inchoate. Even were the process for 
determining pricing terms somehow tantamount to creation, the 
simple naked price is a numerical output, not itself something 
creative. Further, price is arrived at through adverse negotiation, 
unknown until settled by mutual agreement. As such, it is not 
equivalent to the development of the ideas instantiated in the 
pharmaceutical products being sold. 
In fact, the entire notion of price as a creation crumbles apart 
when considering who the creators are. Price emerges during 
negotiations between the two parties to an agreement. If price 
were a valid joint creation of those parties, then neither party could 
reveal the secret without the permission of the other. Thus, the 
drug company would not be able to use the same price (or even 
the same terms) with another PBM or another health plan without 
the original PBM’s permission because the price would belong to 
the two of them jointly.8 
Further, price is created in an adversarial process. An 
adversarial process is decidedly different from the normal context 
of joint creation. And if the creation belongs jointly to the PBM 
and the drug company, the PBM may be violating its fiduciary 
duty to the health plan as the agent and brokers for those plans by 
creating intellectual property that will be owned jointly with a 
party who is supposed to be on the other side of the table from the 
 
8 See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 3.04 & § 5.01[1][c] n.10 (2017) 
(“Courts have held that one joint owner’s use of a secret without the 
permission of the other states a trade secret claim, and that one joint 
owner’s disclosure to a knowing third party without the other’s 
permission also states a claim against both the discloser and the 
recipient.”). 
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health plan—and that cannot be shared with the health plan 
without the drug company’s consent.9 Together, all of these issues 
illustrate the logical absurdity of the notion that price is some type 
of a creation that should be subject to intellectual-property 
protection of any kind. 
Even if one were to conclude that negotiated price points 
between PBMs and pharmaceutical manufacturers might 
constitute a trade secret, however, there would be no protection 
against regulatory disclosure. Neither federal nor state trade-
secrecy laws provide an immunity to the owner of a trade secret 
against regulatory disclosure, and nothing purports to preempt 
regulatory or administrative statutes.10 
In short, trade-secret law does not categorically bar regulatory 
disclosure. Any regulatory activity should lead instead to the 
balancing of the public interest with the harm in disclosure. 
Legislatures are capable of making reasoned decisions regarding 
this calculus—especially as to business entities who seek to 
characterize the very product of their market capture (artificially 
high pricing) as intellectual property.11 Indeed, the case of 
companies engaging in exploitation of the citizenry, who are 
effectively captive buyers of high-priced pharmaceuticals, 
appears to be a model instance where regulators should put the 
brakes on overbroad use of trade-secrecy assertions.  
 
Thin Trade Secrets 
 
Companies seeking to avoid regulatory disclosure of 
pharmaceutical pricing implicitly propose a hard line: once 
information qualifies as a trade secret, it is automatically fully 
protected from disclosure. The trade-secret statutes, however, do 
 
9 For discussions of perverse incentives in which the PBM middle 
players may be tempted to act in the interests of the drug companies 
rather than in the interests of the PBMs’ own client, the health plan, see 
generally FELDMAN, supra note 3. 
10 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.7(a) (“[The Uniform Act] does not 
supersede . . . any statute otherwise regulating trade secrets.”).  
11 See N. States Power Co. v. N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 502 N.W.2d 240, 
247 (N.D. 1993) (finding that price information constituted a trade secret 
but nonetheless was subject to regulatory disclosure because of the 
public interest in knowing the rates charged in natural-gas agreements). 
Vol. 5 The Judges’ Book 99 
not support this conclusion. Rather, trade secrecy mirrors its sister 
intellectual-property doctrines in their nuanced and delicate 
balancing of interests. 
Thus, courts should consider borrowing from copyright to 
develop trade secret’s own version of thinness.12 Thin trade 
secrecy would exist when the independent economic value or 
creative aspect of the secret is scant.13 Unlike secret formulae and 
manufacturing techniques, thin trade secrets would exist near the 
margins of protection. With only weak justification of protection, 
the tug of countervailing public-policy interests would have 
particular force against using that protection to prevent disclosure. 
To prevent entities from claiming a private interest in the guise of 
public policy, thin protection should apply primarily when trade 
secrecy conflicts with public policy in other doctrinal areas. In 
those circumstances, the doctrine of thin trade secrecy creates 
space for navigating the boundaries and accommodating opposing 
interests. 
Even if a court were to find that negotiated price points 
between PBMs and pharmaceutical manufacturers qualify as a 
trade secret, justification for protecting them from disclosure is 
very weak. At most, such pricing information would be a thin and 
untraditional right, not core intellectual property. Any protection 
afforded such a thin trade secret should yield to the public interest 
in regulatory disclosure. 
 
 
12 For a useful analogy in a litigation context, see Joseph P. Fishman & 
Deepa Varadarajan, Similar Secrets, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (2019) 
(recommending a materiality filter for civil cases involving allegations 
of wrongful commercial use, based in part on an analogy to copyright’s 
thinness doctrine, to screen out claims unless the trade secret and the 
defendant’s product bear an especially high degree of similarity to each 
other). Cf. Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1401 (2014) (urging the incorporation of the concept of fair use 
into the law of trade secrets). 
13 One potential hook for a theory of “thin” trade secret protection exists 
in the statutory text, in the requirement that a trade secret have 
independent economic value. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (3)(b); CAL. CIV. 
CODE 3426.1(d)(1) (UTSA example). Such value is a sliding scale—
some trade secrets are more valuable than others—and thus scant value 
may be one way to approach the further development of this concept. 
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Conclusion 
 
It would be ironic indeed if the very thing regulators seek to 
combat—artificially high pharmaceutical pricing abetted by 
opaque deals between PBMs and manufacturers—could itself be 
claimed as a form of intellectual property for the purpose of 
preventing regulatory disclosure. Healthy skepticism about such 
IP claims is in order when the motive behind the claim is to avoid 
regulation and transparency in the strong public interest. The 
special context of pricing in PBM agreements is not a viable 
candidate for trade secrecy. Even if it were, such thin trade secrecy 
should not be a shield against regulatory disclosure.  
